Supreme Court faults Tinubu’s clemency, affirms death sentence for Maryam Sanda

The Supreme Court on Friday re-affirmed the death sentence handed to Maryam Sanda, daughter-in-law of a former Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), who was found guilty of culpable homicide.

An Abuja High Court had, on January 27, 2020, sentenced her to death by hanging after she was found guilty of stabbing her husband, Bilyamin Bello, to death at their Abuja residence in 2017. Although she had already spent about six years and eight months at Suleja Prison, President Bola Tinubu, in the exercise of his executive powers, reduced her sentence to 12 years.

The Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Prince Lateef Fagbemi, SAN, explained that her inclusion in the recent presidential pardon was based on “compassionate grounds and in the best interest of the children,” citing qualities such as “good conduct, embracing a new lifestyle, serving as a model to prisoners, and remorsefulness.”

Meanwhile, a five-member panel of Justices of the apex court, in a split judgment of four-to-one, restated the judicial pronouncement ordering her death by hanging. The court resolved all the issues she raised against her conviction and sentence, dismissing her appeal for lack of merit.

In the lead verdict delivered by Justice Moore Adumein, the apex court held that the prosecution had established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that the Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the trial court’s sentence was unassailable.

The Supreme Court further held that it was wrong for President Tinubu to grant pardon to a convict whose appeal was still pending before it. Referencing several past judgments, Justice Adumein noted that the court had consistently criticised the Executive for granting pardons to those convicted of capital offences while their appeals were pending. He stressed that the clemency extended to Maryam did not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear her appeal and issue appropriate orders.

“By Section 233(2)(d) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal where, as in this case, a death sentence was affirmed.

“I do not think that this jurisdiction can be affected by the grant of pardon by the Executive when an appeal against the death sentence is still pending in the Supreme Court of Nigeria.

When an appeal against a death sentence is pending, it is better and safer to delay granting amnesty or pardon to the convicted person. The grant of pardon during the pendency of appeal does not prevent the court from proceeding to determine the appeal on its merit,” he said.

Justice Adumein added that the Supreme Court found no reason to dislodge the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. “What is obvious in this appeal is that both the trial court and the Court of Appeal made concurrent findings that the deceased was intentionally killed by the appellant, who had a premeditated plan to murder him. I agree with the respondent that this court has no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the two lower courts.”

The apex court also dismissed the appellant’s argument that Section 221 of the Child Rights Act 2003 precluded a trial court from sentencing a woman to death if she was a nursing mother at the time of her conviction.

It held that there was no evidence before the court to show that, at the time of her conviction and sentence, she was either an expectant mother or a nursing mother.

“The principal intendment of the Child Rights Act 2003 is the protection of the rights of the Nigerian child as proclaimed in the preamble to the Act. It is clearly not the intention of the lawmakers that the Act be used as a legal shield preventing an expectant mother or nursing mother from criminal prosecution or criminal liability.

Having resolved all the issues raised in this appeal against the appellant, this appeal is bereft of merit and is hereby dismissed,” Justice Adumein held.

While Justices Uwani Abba-Aji, Ibrahim Saulawa, and Chidiebere Uwa agreed with the majority judgment, Justice Emmanuel Agim dissented.

In his dissenting judgment, Justice Agim allowed the appeal and vacated the appellant’s conviction and death sentence.

It will be recalled that a three-man panel of the appellate court had, on December 4, 2020, unanimously upheld Maryam’s sentence after dismissing her 20 grounds of appeal.

She had accused the trial judge, Justice Yusuf Halilu, of bias, insisting that he relied on circumstantial and hearsay evidence to sentence her to death.

Alleging denial of fair hearing, the convict told the appellate court that there was no confessional statement, no murder weapon, no corroboration of evidence by two witnesses, and no autopsy report to determine the true cause of her husband’s death.

According to her, the trial court’s judgment occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice, and she prayed to be discharged and acquitted of the culpable homicide charge that led to her conviction.

She also argued that the trial judge’s failure to rule on a preliminary objection she filed to challenge the charge against her, and the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it, rendered the judgment a nullity.

In addition, she alleged that the judge erred and misdirected himself by usurping the role of the police when he assumed the duty of an Investigating Police Officer (IPO).

She quoted the trial judge as saying: “I wish to state that I have a duty thrust upon me to investigate and discover what will satisfy the interest and demands of justice.

Maryam maintained that the trial judge failed to restrict himself to the evidence adduced before the court.

“The court’s usurpation of the duty of the police by taking it upon itself to investigate and discover negatively coloured its assessment of the available evidence and resulted in it reaching an unjust decision contrary to the evidence before it,” she argued.

However, the appellate court, in its lead judgment delivered by Justice Stephen Adah, said it was not in doubt that the appellant killed her husband.

It faulted the trial judge for failing to rule on the preliminary objection before delivering final judgment in the matter.

The appellate court invoked its powers under Section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, and dismissed Maryam’s pending preliminary objection for lack of merit.

The court held that the trial judge was right in his verdict, adding that the offence of culpable homicide committed by the appellant was punishable by death under Section 221 of the Penal Code.

It noted that there was evidence that the appellant murdered her husband during a fight that ensued after she saw a nude picture of a girl on his phone.

culled from vanguard.